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Analysis

Oscar Abraham Raya López

Contemporary relations between the United States and Cuba: roller coaster between politics and approaches

- Despite the lifting of sanctions in May being a good sign, the US government's decision not to invite Cuba to the ninth Summit of the Americas casts doubt on its intentions with the small Caribbean country.

Contemporary relations between the United States and Cuba: roller coaster between politics and approaches

On May 16, 2022, the administration of US President Joe Biden announced that it would expand its support for Cuban nationals through various measures, such as facilitating access to Internet services for Cuban companies (U.S. Department of State, 2022 , pars 1-5). Among the most important actions are also the expansion to flights beyond Havana and the reestablishment of the program to reunify Cuban families in the United States (Sanger, 2022, par. 1).

The current position of the Biden government stands in stark contrast to that of his predecessor, Donald Trump, toward Cuba. The former president changed the US foreign policy marked by Barack Obama with respect to the island country, thus imposing new sanctions against the Caribbean country with the intention of holding the Cuban regime responsible for human rights abuses ignored under the Obama administration (Embassies of the United States in Cuba, 2017, pars 1-3).

In addition, during his tenure, Obama managed a cooperative foreign policy with Cuba by carrying out actions such as his face-to-face meeting with Raúl Castro in 2015 during the seventh Summit of the Americas or his declaration that no one benefited from pushing Cuba to the brink of collapse ( Leo Grande, 2015, p.485). Contemporary US-Cuban relations are highly volatile and depend on who occupies the White House.

The government of Barack Obama (2009–2017): normalization

With a political platform that promised a rapprochement with Cuba and an end to the restrictions on Cuban-American remittances and family trips, Barack Obama, a Democratic candidate, won the presidential elections with a high percentage of the Cuban vote in the United States (LeoGrande, 2015, p. 479). However, although he declared real intentions to change the US position towards Cuba, Obama made no noticeable changes during his first years in office.

For the sixth Summit of the Americas in 2012 in Colombia , foreign policy towards Cuba was maintained without any considerable change, which generated discontent in a Latin America led by Brazil and Colombia, fed up with Cuban isolation (LeoGrande, 2015, p. 482 ). Despite the deep opposition, the United States opted not to allow the Caribbean country to attend the event and continue with its policy against it, however, all the negativity towards its position generated a change in long-term strategy.

In order not to jeopardize his bilateral relations in the Latin American region, destroying in the process the Summit of the Americas and weakening the Organization of American States, OAS, Obama finally changed the position of the United States regarding Cuba ( Leo Grande, 2015, p.482).

The most far-reaching and important change occurred in 2014. During the preparations for the seventh Summit of the Americas, Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro announced that their countries would reestablish diplomatic relations for the first time since 1961 (Biegon, 2020, p.46). Other major changes followed after that historic moment. For example, the Obama administration relaxed restrictions on Cuban-American remittances, travel to Cuba, telecommunications, and financial services; the Caribbean country's classification as a "promoter of terrorism" was also withdrawn, and the embassies of both nations were reopened (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, par 11).

Although the efforts were quite significant and widely accepted, there were restrictions that Obama, for whatever reason, was unwilling or unable to remove. The essence of the US embargo on Cuba remained in force: US companies still cannot invest in that country or do business with Cuban parastatal companies, except for selling food or telecommunications equipment (LeoGrande, 2015, p. 486).

During his last years as president, Obama made new moves to restore relations with Cuba. In 2016 he visited Havana, being the first president of the United States to do so since Calvin Coolidge in 1928 and a year later, shortly before leaving office, he repealed the "wet foot, dry foot" policy, an action that pleased the government Cuban (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, par. 12-13).

The government of Donald Trump (2017–2021): a more radical position?

During his 2016 campaign, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, declared that the rapprochement with Cuba was "good" and that the embargo had lasted "long enough", however, after experiencing opposition to that position in Florida, a strategic state for his victory, Trump changed his tactics (Biegon, 2020, p. 46). Already as president in 2017, the recently elected Head of State wasted no time in starting his new strategy against Cuba.

Only months after his inauguration, Trump introduced a series of sanctions that destroyed almost the entire process achieved by Obama to normalize bilateral relations with Havana, also calling on the Cuban government to "end abuses against political dissidents" ( Congressional Research Service, 2021, p.24). Even with a new, more aggressive rhetoric around Cuba, the Trump administration did not seek to isolate that country drastically. It is true that the "wet foot, dry foot" policy was reestablished and financial and travel sanctions were imposed, however, Cuba was no longer considered a "promoter of terrorism" and its participation in the eighth Summit of Cuba was respected. the Americas (Biegon, 2020, p. 64).

On the other hand, an important factor to consider during the Trump administration is Venezuela. This is because, probably, the United States has not unleashed more sanctions against Cuba because, in the eyes of Trump, Venezuela and Nicolás Maduro required more attention, see as an example the lobbying in the OAS to expel Caracas (Biegon, 2020 , pp. 64-65). In the end, indirectly, Venezuela caused the United States to retake importance to Cuba. In 2019, the Trump administration imposed new economic sanctions on the small Caribbean country with the intention of discouraging its support for the Nicolas Maduro regime and to force the Cuban government to improve its record of human rights abuses (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p.25).

Two years later, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world and for a few moments there was hope for change for Cuba. Michelle Bachelet, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, asked the US government to relax the sanctions, because Cuba could not access sufficient medical equipment to care for those infected with COVID-19 (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p.27). The response from the United States was not long in coming. The Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, declared that his government would not suspend or relax the sanctions against Cuba and that Bachelet was lying because no sanction blocked humanitarian aid to the Caribbean country (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p. 27).

The government of Joe Biden (2021–2024): a misunderstood position

As presidential candidate, Joe Biden promised to reverse all the sanctions that Trump imposed on Cuba, accusing them of being useless to achieve progress in human rights and democracy in the island country (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, par. 19). Already as president, Biden from day one undertook forceful actions to reverse several of the policies made by his predecessor, see the clear example of the Paris Agreement.

In the Cuban case, the reforms were not immediate. He only limited himself to declaring that the United States hoped to eventually withdraw economic and travel sanctions, in addition to appointing a senior State Department official to review relations with Cuba (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, par. 19). At the same time that this was happening in the United States, the Cuban government also began to undergo important changes.

In 2021, Diaz-Canel, the new president of Cuba, replaced Raúl Castro as the first Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, bringing with him important economic reforms such as a partial end to restrictions on private business (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, par. 20). A year later, various restrictions remained in place until May 2022, as mentioned at the beginning of this writing. However, the relaxation and lifting of sanctions under the Biden administration can be considered very limited when compared with all the progress that Obama, president of the same party, achieved under his mandate.

Likewise, various diplomats from the Biden government have expressed that restoring the 2017 status quo with Cuba at once is complicated; The priority for the United States is to have good relations with the Cuban people and not with their government (Sanger, 2022, par. 5-6). So far, only a little over a year has passed since the start of the Biden presidency, so it is impossible to know for sure how the bilateral relationship will evolve in the future. Despite the lifting of sanctions in May being a good sign, the US government's decision not to invite Cuba to the ninth Summit of the Americas casts doubt on its intentions with the small Caribbean country.

Sources

    Biegon, R. (2020). The normalization of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba? Rapprochement and Regional Hegemony. Latin American Politics and Society, 62, 46-72. Recuperado de: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/abs/normalization-of-us-policy-toward-cuba-rapprochement-and-regional-hegemony/E2733914BC9C94F16E972B6A54B18DE9

    Congressional Research Service. (2021). Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration. Recuperado de: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45657.pdf

    Council on Foreign Relations. (2021). US-Cuba Relations. Recuperado de: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations

    Embajada de los Estados Unidos en Cuba. (2017). Hoja informativa sobre la política respecto a Cuba. Recuperado de: https://cu.usembassy.gov/es/hoja-informativa-sobre-la-politica-respecto-cuba/

    LeoGrande, W. (2015). Normalazing US-Cuba relations: escaping the shackles of the past. International Affairs, 91, 473-488. Recuperado de: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/INTA91_3_02_LeoGrande.pdf

    Sanger, D. (16 de mayo de 2022). Biden Administration Lifting Some Trump-Era Restrictions on Cuba. The New York Times. Recuperado de: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-cuba-policy.html

    U.S. Department of State. (2022). Biden Administration Expands Support to the Cuban People. Recuperado de: https://www.state.gov/biden-administration-expands-support-to-the-cuban-people/


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Raya, Oscar. “Relaciones contemporáneas entre Estados Unidos y Cuba: montaña rusa entre políticas y aproximaciones.” CEMERI, 23 sept. 2022, https://cemeri.org/en/art/a-estados-unidos-relaciones-cuba-fv.