Central America must refocus its regional security environmentally

Ajust two weeks after Eta, the twelfth and fifth largest storm of the season, hit the region; Hurricane Iota again called into question the regional security strategy in the isthmus: 91 deaths, more than 9 million affected, and $5.5 billion in losses (PAHO 2020).

The causes and consequences of extreme phenomena are not limited to temporary dimensions: they translate into long-term effects that constantly cripple the autonomy of States.

In terms of power, the loss of autonomy leads to greater susceptibility to external pressures -actors or phenomena-; and less capacity to include policies or topics on the international agenda.

Therefore, both in terms of sustainability and sovereignty, advocating for a new regional security strategy in Central America that identifies more relevant threats such as climate change or environmental adaptation becomes imperative given the current scenario.

The role of citizen organizations is key to achieving this.

Stagnation

Since 1995, regional security in Central America has been derived from the Democratic Security Framework Treaty.

As an attempt to materially expand the security agenda in Central American countries after brutal conflicts, the agreement recognized the importance of sustainable development and civil institutions to its objectives.

And although since the 90s extreme phenomena have competed with organized crime and violence; It is these last two that have pushed the old security perspectives to the north of the region.

In fact, almost 30 years after the treaty, the role of the armed forces in the face of transnational threats -with the exception of Costa Rica and Panama- has been accentuated; currently preserved in the rest of Latin America.

Source: Own elaboration with data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security and the ECLAC Social Investment Database (2018).

Comparing environmental protection spending and Defense spending at the regional level [2], the percentage differences in in relation to GDP between one spending and another * have been exceeded 1% for the past decade.*

Even under the Biden administration's commitments to the Northern Triangle - one of the few sub-regions that will receive direct attention - the dynamic is repeated; by not mentioning vulnerability and environmental adaptation among the plans for the "prosperity" of the region.

How, then, do you overcome this conventional perspective or the lack of political awareness that directly affects all the actors and sectors of the Central American scene that seems not to change?

At first, accepting the need for a refocus on national security from within.

The former president of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Climate Change, Rajendra K. Pachauri, in a conversation with the Wilson Center, already discussed the idea of socially and humanely expanding the concept of national security through the environmental prism. Explaining:

“(...) that economic vulnerability and dependence on resources play a key determining role between environmental change and the potential for periods of violence and insecurity, particularly, in the population living in poverty in underdeveloped countries[3 ].

Source: self made. Note: Panama and Costa Rica do not have armed forces. However, their percentage of spending on security institutions for 2014 were among the highest in Latin America: 2.68 and 1.71, respectively ([RESDAL; 2014](https://www.resdal.org/assets/ atlas-2014-complete.pdf)) Its spending on environmental protection reached 0.42 and 0.12 in 2016.

Only in the case of Honduras, whose 48.3% of the total population was below the poverty line before the pandemic, the economic effects of Eta and Iota translated into more than $1,879 million, being the private sector (commerce, housing, agriculture) the hardest hit with 69% of the total damage ([CEPAL](https://honduras.un.org/es/105947-informe-de-cepal-eta-e-iota-tuvieron-un-impacto-de- more than-45-billion-lempiras-in)).

In this area, the former director's vision is fully applicable to the Central American case. More important: considering the low specific weight of the region; the impact of these phenomena translates into long-term dependencies.

This responsibility is too important to be left solely to the full will of the Central American governments, whose foreign policies have been mostly reactive and interrupted.

Therefore, strengthen the work of local actors (citizens, non-governmental organizations and academic sectors) through [international cooperation](https://cemeri.org/art/cid-sostenibilidad- water/) becomes the second key for refocusing.

These organizations from civil society increasingly compete as international actors and exert first-hand pressure that is very difficult for diplomatic representatives to emulate.

In fact, due to its geographical position and vulnerability; The Climate Change and Risk Management pillar, after Economic Integration, is the main recipient of the European Union's cooperation in Central America with 29.65% of the total funds in execution (SICA 2020).

Programs such as EUROCLIMA, supported by AECID, the French AFD or the German GIZ, represent privileged opportunities to promote environmental governance in the sub-region.

With the reorganization of the international scene underway; the power will be read in the capacity of the regions to resist external changes. This will be decisive for the success or failure of any future strategy in Central America or another region.

If these two actions are taken, the SICA Member States could not only begin to link their foreign policies in the face of a constant threat to their national security; rather, they would help to energize the process of political integration.

The repercussions of inaction will not only affect the rural or private sectors of Central America, but also the countries of the hemisphere. Therefore, an effort of these dimensions will require strong inter-American support.