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Analysis

Alberto Moreno Carmona

China, ASEAN and the Coup in Myanmar

- The social convulsion has been launched against the Military Junta and has generated a union between the different ethnic groups against the coup leaders.

China, ASEAN and the Coup in Myanmar

The political situation within Myanmar is complex and dangerous, as the nation is on the verge of a political and social collapse of magnitudes never seen before. The social convulsion has been launched against the Military Junta and has generated a union between the different ethnic groups against the coup leaders. However, the conflict has the potential to become regionalized, since the military government has focused on repression and violence against the civilian population, while the governments of the region have complied with the totalitarian regime.

On February 1, 2021, Myanmar's military forces, the Tatmadaw, orchestrated a coup against the New Democratic League government led by Daw Aung Saan Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, who would take protest that day after the landslide victory. in the November 2020 elections. After the unsubstantiated complaint of electoral fraud, a Military Junta was formed made up of the General and Chief of the Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing together with Myint Swe, former general and vice president, declared President during the one-year emergency period and Wunna Maung Lwin, chancellor during the transition period of U Thein Sein, taking over as chancellor again.

Myanmar and China, distant partners and border instability

Nay Pyi Taw and Beijing have a long history of diplomatic relations, as after the 1962 coup (also orchestrated by the Tatmadaw against a democratically elected government) the nation found itself in an ostracized situation where China was the bastion of military government. The US and Western blockade pushed Burma towards economic dependence on China. The military government maintained brutal control over the civilian population and, thanks to China's protection, received no international attention or condemnation.

During the Chinese economic takeoff process, Myanmar benefited from the economic spillover from the provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi in the primary product sectors (hydrocarbons and agricultural sector)[1]. Economic activity has been on the rise with increasing reliance on Myanmar. China has a great interest in Myanmar, so investment in infrastructure projects as part of the New Silk Road project is increasing [2]. Myanmar is essential for the development of the southern provinces of China, as they provide energy and food to the large industrial communities. However, there is a feeling of discontent on the part of the Myanmar population towards the Chinese investment, as they consider it to be a looting of their natural resources.

Economic Sectors Infrastructure Projects
Energy (hydroelectric, gas, oil) Myitsone Dam for hydroelectric power generation (Canceled)
Agriculture Deep Ocean Port in Kyaukpyu
Tourism (annual growth of 7%) Gas and oil pipeline lines in the Kyaukpyu-Yunnan-Guanxi corridor
These sectors have an attractive market for investment due to their comparative advantages Mekong Economic Corridor (Mandalay-Kolkata Corridor

Myanmar's strategic sectors have developed thanks to Chinese investment. Source: self made

However, the Chinese government is very close to the Myanmar administration even during the democratic transition and the rise of the National Democratic League. In 2014 they issued the Joint Declaration between China and Myanmar to Strengthen the Comprehensive Cooperation Strategy that ensured Chinese interests in the democratization process and although the government of Aung San Suu Kyi sought to diversify diplomatic and economic relations to have a wide margin of negotiation , maintained a hotline known as the Partnership Dialogue to Strengthen Connectivity used for policy coordination, connectivity facilitation, unrestricted trade, and financial integration [3]. Suu Kyi was a frequent visitor to China and never dissented against Beijing, a situation that earned her government protection.

Beijing keeps its distance from Myanmar outside of economic interests as it also represents a risky border. Myanmar's fertile fields are also home to illegal opium plantations that it shares on the borders of Laos and Thailand, the Golden Triangle region that in 1998 once produced around 66% of all opium globally [4]. Although opium production has been drastically reduced, the Kachin and Shan states remain a strong center of production due to their political instability.

Relations between Beijing and the Tatmadaw have always been fragile, since Myanmar has accused China of supporting ethnic armed militias on the border between the two nations since its independence. There is no confidence in the Myanmar armed forces because, despite keeping their country under a dictatorship, the generals only have a vocation for war and totally lack any political preparation (despite the fact that the Constitution reserves 25% of the Parliament posts for the military) [5].

Chinese discontent with Myanmar deepened during the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2017. Although China and Russia vetoed both British and American resolutions condemning the regime in Myanmar and holding it responsible for the army's actions against the Muslim population [6\ ], instability at the borders increased with the massive movement of refugees heading to Cox Camp in Bangladesh, fearing that this would spark uprisings by Muslims in their own territory. This was not the first time this had happened, as in 2007 an uprising by Muslim monks known as the Saffron Revolution posed a potential danger of uprisings in Tibet.

In the current coup, China has been repeatedly accused by protesters of complicity with the regime, demanding that it take forceful action against the Military Junta. “The military dictatorship in Myanmar is made in China” read the protest banners. The protesters' accusations argue that China provided the firewall used to block social media. The Chinese government broke the tradition of keeping silent and issued a statement denying the accusation [7].

What is certain is that China has blocked attempts to put pressure on the Military Junta at the international level and has given the tacit protection of the coup during the visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Yangon [8]. The United States submitted to the United Nations Security Council a statement condemning the coup in Myanmar, which China blocked as a permanent member [9]. The United States has had a greater interest in improving relations with Myanmar since the Obama administration, through diplomatic rapprochement and the lifting of sanctions [10]. In the face of the coup, Myanmar has moved high on the US policy agenda, and President Biden has launched harsh trade and economic sanctions demanding that the Junta relinquish power and end the Emergency Period.

Protests in Myanmar accuse China of complacency with the Tatmadaw Source: FT

The infamous "non-intervention" of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ANSEA) is one of the longest-running integration organizations in the region. Despite having initiated efforts towards political and social integration, its mission has been predominantly economic and commercial. Myanmar was excluded from the body's participation, just as the dictatorship had no interest in getting involved in international activities.

In 1997, Myanmar acceded to ASEAN, a year after the violent crackdown on the student movement. ASEAN members remained silent about what happened, but this did not remain so, as in 2003, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamed, as the leader of ASEAN, issued a statement calling for expulsion from Myanmar until Suu was released. Kyi, arrested after the attack on a convoy of her political party [11].

2007 and 2008 were crucial years, as the Saffron Revolution in response to the economic crisis led to violence and protests that the military government could not control. The situation worsened in 2008 with Cyclone Nargis which caused irreparable damage to the rice-growing shorelines in the Bay of Bengal. ASEAN bypassed the Military Junta and directly coordinated international aid to the victims [12]. That same year, ASEAN approved the regional Constitution in which the principles of democracy and human rights were adopted for the first time, this still from a perspective focused on non-intervention [13]**. **

During the current crisis, ASEAN is divided to take action. Despite already having meetings between ministers, there is no consensus on what actions to take. The coup foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, met in Bangkok with the foreign ministers of Thailand and Indonesia on February 24. However, the meeting was held behind closed doors and no comment or statement was issued on the matter [14] . The diplomatic representation of Myanmar is in dispute, since the ambassador of Myanmar before the United Nations made a call against the coup d'etat and has shown himself in contempt against the indications of the new foreign minister [15].

The ASEAN presidency is currently held by Brunei Darussalam, which issued a statement calling for "dialogue, reconciliation and a return to normality" [16]. The 2021 ASEAN Summit will be held in April, however, although the Myanmar issue will be at the top of the agenda, it is unlikely to see forceful actions, since the situation within ASEAN is not as desired either. Likewise, the presence of electoral observers in the 2020 elections completely nullifies the argument of electoral fraud.

The protesters demand that ASEAN respect the November elections, as they suspect that they can reach an agreement to respect the Emergency Period, despite the fact that the elections were supervised by the Association itself. Source: Bangkok Post

In both Thailand and Indonesia there have been massive demonstrations against their governments, undermining the legitimacy of their actions internationally. In addition to this, there are strong links between the Thai military and the Tatmadaw, so Thailand is expected to argue that this is purely a matter of domestic politics [17]. In addition to Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and the Philippines have already issued statements arguing that the situation is exclusively Myanmar's internal affair. The only nation that has issued a statement condemning the coup and violence against protesters has been Singapore, declaring that "deadly force is inexcusable" [18].

A potential regional conflict

Source: Bangkok Post

Violence is escalating rapidly due to clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Civil Disobedience Movement. Demonstrations have been called every day in all cities, states and communities, without existing social factions that give legitimacy to the Junta.

The United Nations Special Envoy for Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, stated that there was broad support for the protests that cut across different ethnic groups and that, faced with the threat of economic sanctions, the Tatmadaw argued that they have long survived the sanctions. time [19].

The Tatmadaw tried to include the Ethnic Parties in the State Administration Council of the Military Junta, however, they refused and instead joined the General Strike Committee. The junta's strategy was to take advantage of the shortcomings of Suu Kyi's National Democratic League, which had privileged ethnic Bamar and Buddhist groups, but she has not lost the popularity that earned her the second electoral victory.

The existence of ethnic organizations are the main regional threat to the Tatmadaw. The Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army in Rakhine State and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy have declared protection against the Armed Forces for their ethnic minorities, but have also declared their willingness to work together against the Junta. Military [20]. The Karen National Union, the largest association of the Bamar ethnic group, is the main group demanding the release and restitution of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Aung San Suu Kyi lost national and international popularity for defending the Tatmadaw's 2017 crimes against the Rohingya. Although it is suspected that the State Counselor was not primarily responsible for the crimes of ethnic cleansing, she made the decision to personally defend the Armed Forces in the Hague Court, demonstrating her complicity. This action was probably taken to displace the military from the political scene, however, it had no effect.

The civilian population has never felt belonging to the Armed Forces despite the fact that they have a strong impact on the history of the nation and associate the founder Aung San with the figure of her daughter above the military institution. The image that the Tatmadaw cannot be defeated is blurred and strongly motivates protests and armed movements.

Inside Myanmar the situation is becoming increasingly violent and neither party seems willing to compromise with the other. The differences between the different factions at the regional level show that neither China nor ASEAN are benefiting from a coup that has the potential to destabilize the region and plunge its neighbors into the conflict, but the little initiative towards forceful actions demonstrates that there is no strong commitment to democracy in Myanmar. At the international level, the protests in Myanmar do not seem to have enough support, but every day they grow stronger in response to the growing violence of the Military Junta.

Sources

    1. Cerda, C. (2015). Coyunturas y recelos de la reinserción internacional de Myanmar. México y la Cuenca del Pacífico, 19-46. Obtenido de https://doi.org/10.32870/mycp.v3i9.470

    2. Chenyang, L., & Shaojun, S. (2019). China’s OBOR Initiative and Myanmar’s Political Economy. The Chinese Economy, 318-332. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2018.1457324

    3. Global New Light of Myanmar. (11 de Marzo de 2018). “One Belt-One Road Initiative and MYANMAR” Connectivity: Synergy Issue and Potentialities. Obtenido de Global New Light of Myanmar: https://www.gnlm.com.mm/one-belt-one-road-initiative-myanmar-connectivity-synergy-issue-potentialities/

    4. UNODC. (2016). Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Golden Triangle (Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand). Viena: UNODC. Obtenido de https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Golden_triangle_2006.pdf

    5. Callahan, M. (2003). Making enemies: War and State Building in Burma. New York: Cornell University Press.

    6. Gao, C. (13 de Septiembre de 2017). On Rohingya Issue, Both China and India Back Myanmar Government. Obtenido de The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/on-rohingya-issue-both-china-and-india-back-myanmar-government/

    7. Rasheed, Z. (18 de Febrero de 2021). Myanmar protesters urge China to condemn coup. Will Beijing act? Obtenido de Al-Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/18/myanmar-protesters-urge-china-to-condemn-coup-will-beijing-act

    8. Lee Myers, S., & Beech, H. (16 de Febrero de 2021). In Geopolitical Struggle Over Myanmar, China Has an Edge. Obtenido de New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/asia/myanmar-coup-china-united-states.html

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    12. Mathur, S. (3 de Febrero de 2021). Myanmar’s Coup D’Etat: What Role for ASEAN? Obtenido de The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmars-coup-detat-what-role-for-asean/

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    14. Japan Times. (24 de Febrero de 2021). Myanmar minister flies to Thailand for crisis talks. Obtenido de Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/02/24/asia-pacific/myanmar-envoy-thailand/

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    16. Mathur, S. (3 de Febrero de 2021). Myanmar’s Coup D’Etat: What Role for ASEAN? Obtenido de The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmars-coup-detat-what-role-for-asean/

    17. Head, J. (26 de Febrero de 2021). Analysis: Can Asia help Myanmar find a way out of coup crisis? Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56192105

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    19. Lederer, E. (4 de Marzo de 2021). UN envoy: Myanmar army is ‘surprised’ at opposition to coup. Obtenido de Associated Press: https://apnews.com/article/world-news-aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmar-asia-united-nations-e742e3bd1032d4422fc4d927ef95d9c8

    20. Fawthrop, T. (27 de Febrero de 2021). Myanmar’s Ethnic Groups Join Together to Reject Military Rule. Obtenido de The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmars-ethnic-groups-join-together-to-reject-military-rule/

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    Chachavalpongpun, P. (Enero de 2013). Myanmar Open-up and ASEAN. Obtenido de Prachatai English: https://prachatai.com/english/node/3482

    Myanmar ISIS. (2020). Myanmar: Alongside the pandemic’s effects on the economy and the politics, the NLD government faces greater hurdles in 2021. Yangon: Myanmar ISIS. Obtenido de https://www.myanmarisis.org/publication_pdf/arkar-kyaw-political-risk-analysis-misis-sQ7t7O.pdf

    Swan Ye Tun, A. (24 de Febrero de 2021). Why Did the Tatmadaw’s ‘War Fighters’ Seize Power? Obtenido de The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/why-did-the-tatmadaws-war-fighters-seize-power/


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Moreno, Alberto. “China, la ANSEA y el Golpe de Estado en Myanmar.” CEMERI, 15 sept. 2022, https://cemeri.org/en/art/a-china-ansea-golpe-myanmar-cu.