Between fishing nets and sovereign rights in the South China Sea: Illegal fishing in the Indonesian EEZ

Since the end of last year, Indonesia and China have had diplomatic friction due to various incursions by Chinese fishing fleets around the Natuna Islands, located in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In January 2020, three Indonesian military vessels drove out more than 50 Chinese fishing boats that were fishing irregularly in the area [1].

After these facts became known, the Indonesian government summoned the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, Xiao Qian, to officially issue a protest. The Foreign Ministry declared that Indonesia would never recognize "the nine-point line" (a vast area that China claims as its own, stretching from its southern shores to the countries bordering the South China Sea) \ [2].

The Natuna Islands border the South China Sea, where China and four Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines) have competing claims to sovereignty over the Sea. Beijing maintains that the Natuna are part of its "traditional fishing grounds "and that the area is within the nine-point line through which it claims about 90 percent of the disputed area. In response to the Indonesian protest, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Chinese fishermen were free to do business there, and nothing would change "the objective fact that China has rights" to those waters.

Map showing the nine dotted line (marine territory claimed by China), and the territorial claims of the other countries in the region. Retrieved from futuredirections.org [3].

On Wednesday, January 1, Indonesia rejected China's historic claims, which are unilateral, without legal basis and have never been recognized by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In addition, Indonesia sent warships and fighter planes to patrol the area. For his part, President Joko Widodo also visited the region to affirm Jakarta's sovereign power over it.

Indonesia claims to have sovereignty over these islands, and consequently, over a 200-maritime-mile strip that surrounds them, that is, its Exclusive Economic Zone. The Indonesian government appeals to UNCLOS to claim its sovereign rights over this area; he also recalled that Beijing's claims in the South China Sea had been refuted by a court in The Hague in 2016, after the Philippines filed a case.

The importance of fishing in Indonesia, an island country; and the damage caused by irregular fishing in its EEZ

Indonesia is the world's second largest seafood producer (first being China). The fishing sector generates approximately $4.1 billion USD in annual export revenue, and represents about 2.6% of the national GDP. Fishing activity supports more than 7 million jobs and provides more than 50% of the food protein of animal origin to the Indonesian population. However, the fishing industry faces uncertainty as some marine fish stocks are at risk of overfishing; they also face management challenges, such as insufficient data and research and limited investment opportunities in socially and environmentally responsible fisheries [4].

Fishermen holding a seine net, locally known as a “cantrang”. Image courtesy of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries; retrieved from Mongabay [5].

Indonesia straddles the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and is home to much of the Coral Triangle, a region that has the greatest diversity of reef and coral fish in the world [6]. The richness in stocks of commercial fishing species makes the Natuna region an important fishing ground in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia claims to lose millions of dollars every year due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing within its EEZ. That is why the Indonesian government claims its sovereign rights, and redoubled efforts to stop incursions by foreign fishing fleets.

Violations of the Indonesian EEZ

Since 2010, Indonesia has been involved in at least seven maritime clashes with Chinese Coast Guard (GCC) vessels, in which Indonesia has tried to prevent Chinese illegal fishing within its EEZ. In past incidents, at least the ones that have been publicly reported, GCC vessels have generally been present to protect Chinese trawlers engaged in IUU fishing [7].

However, something changed on September 12, when the latest in a long series of maritime clashes between the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut, or Bakamla) and the GCC took place. In the engagement, the Bakamla KN Pulau Nipah-321 vessel identified a GCC vessel, GCC-5402, which was sailing within the EEZ around the Natuna Islands.

In response to the raid, Bakamla intercepted and established radio communication with GCC 5402. The incident resulted in a bilateral diplomatic spat when the Chinese ship claimed it had the "right to patrol" inside the Nine Point Line. The September incident was qualitatively different from previous ones, as the GCC deliberately entered the Indonesian EEZ without the presence of Chinese fishing vessels [8].

The absence of Chinese fishing boats sailing together with the Chinese Coast Guard gives the conflict a nuance of dispute over the sovereignty of the Islands. However, Chinese vessels are not the only intruders.

Indonesian coast guard personnel detain a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Natuna Islands in July this year. Photo: AFP, recovered from This week in Asia [9].

And it is that, only in the period between June and October of this year, the Indonesian authorities have seized at least 31 foreign fishing boats that practiced IUU fishing north of the Natuna Islands, according to information from the NGO Destructive Fishing Watch (DFW).

Of the total of those ships, 21 were of Vietnamese nationality, and in fact, none came from China. DFW national coordinator Moh Abdi Suhufan said the Indonesian government should increase surveillance and increase military patrols at sea. He said that the Vietnamese boats were aggressive, and that they would probably try to flee or crash into surveillance boats operated by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries \ [10 ].

The South China Sea: a biodiverse, geostrategic territory disputed by five countries

As noted above, the region's riparian countries are vying for sovereign rights they may have in the South China Sea. This dispute began when, as a result of World War II, Japan was forced to give up the two large (currently disputed) archipelagos of Spratly and Paracelsus. China is the one that asks for most of the territory, according to Beijing, its right goes back centuries, when those Islands were considered an integral part of China. Vietnam claims they have documents proving they have ruled the islands. The Philippines, for its part, alleges its geographical proximity; and Brunei and Malaysia claim part of the area, alluding to international agreements.

Map showing land claims of countries bordering the South China Sea. Recovered from: elordenmundial.com [12].

Sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea is coveted because they are rich in natural resources, and the world's largest commercial transit occurs there. Annually, between exports and imports, the commercial activity leaves around 3.4 million USD, equivalent to 20% of the capital related to international trade. And not only this; there are an estimated 11 billion barrels of crude oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas on the seabed. In addition, 12% of world fishing is produced there [13].

This map shows the trade flows of crude oil in the South China Sea. This representation is illustrative, since it shows the main trade routes in the region, through which not only crude oil is transported, but also all kinds of goods and inputs. It can be seen that the disputed sea is an obligatory passage to quickly reach the Strait of Malacca, and eventually reach the European markets. Map retrieved from: elordenmundial.com [14].

The maritime sovereignty that would grant control over the Paracelsus and Spratly Islands would give their holder rights to -possibly- regulate the passage through these waters, to take advantage of the mineral and fishing resources, and to benefit economically from the commercial flow between the West and the East , which must necessarily cross the Strait of Malacca.

Note that there are also disputes between some member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over sovereignty in these waters; such as: Jakarta and Manila, which in 2014 signed an agreement to resolve a dispute over their overlapping EEZs, while in 2009 Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to clarify their positions and legal limits over their claims in the Sea. Also of note is a 2008 ruling by the International Court of Justice that settled a decades-long dispute over islets in the Singapore Strait, with sovereignty over Pedra Branca going to Singapore and Middle Rocks to Malaysia. [fifteen].

Vietnam and Indonesia are currently holding talks to delineate their EEZs, and the successful conclusion of these negotiations would help reduce tensions. In contrast, China's non-cooperative attitude with respect to the provisions of UNCLOS, and with respect to the 2016 Hague court decision; it has reduced the level of confidence of most Indonesians in Beijing's willingness to respect Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna.

Indonesia's response to the violation of its sovereign rights over the EEZ

Although it is rare for Chinese fishing vessels to exploit the waters of the Indonesian EEZ, the threat posed by GCC vessels is great. After the incident on September 12, when the Chinese Coast Guard turned up without the Chinese fishing company, the conflict was delineated as one of contested maritime borders, and not just a conflict caused by fishing exploitation. This means that the Indonesian government must be prepared to respond accordingly to the situation in the future [16].

In fact, for the past five years, the Indonesian government had been hesitating whether to frame the issue as a traditional border dispute, preferring to view the maritime clashes between Bakamla and the GCC in the South China Sea as "fishing incidents." This is understandable, given Indonesia's position as a non-claiming state in the South China Sea, a position it has taken since the 1990s. Furthermore, it is convenient given China's economic and military preponderance in the region [17] .

Due to the above, the Indonesian government has taken different measures to enforce its sovereign rights over the EEZ, under the pretext of combating IUU fishing, and arguing that achieving sustainable fishing levels is its ultimate goal.

The “sink them all” policy to combat IUU fishing (2014-2019)

Indonesia's former Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, set out to fight against IUU fishing, and against unsustainable fishing. So she made two big changes to Indonesia's fisheries policies. One of the changes was the ban on purse seines, locally known as “cantrang”.

The cantrang are considered a type of unsustainable fishing gear, because they are dragged along the seabed, and as a result they destroy corals and reefs, in addition to having a high rate of bycatch. The ban was imposed in 2015 by Susi in an attempt to protect coastal areas that serve as fish spawning grounds. But the ban drew harsh criticism from some fishermen, particularly along Java's north coast, where many rely on these types of nets. In 2018, Susi relented, giving fishermen in that region a grace period until February 2020, plus financial help to transition to more sustainable gear[18].

Another of the main fishing policies applied by Pudjiastuti was the most extreme; shortly after taking office in 2014, she announced that foreign fishing vessels caught for IUU fishing in Indonesian waters would be seized, and scuttled. This particular regulation was very popular at the national level, and Susi insisted that it was trying to ensure sustainable fishing.

For her part, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Indroyono Soesilo, stressed that the legal basis of the policy is paragraph 4 of article 69 of Law no. 45 of 2009 on fishing. According to the article, subject to sufficient preliminary evidence, the Indonesian authorities may burn and/or sink foreign vessels suspected of illegal fishing in an Indonesian fisheries management zone. However, the article lacks a definition of "Indonesia's fisheries management areas", which could create conflicts with what is established in UNCLOS [19].

Much was said, at the time, about the policy of sinking fishing vessels engaged in IUU fishing in the Indonesian EEZ. Article 73 of the UNCLOS establishes the measures that can be taken to enforce the laws and regulations by the coastal State in the EEZ, and these do not include the sinking of vessels. Under the UNCLOS regime, law enforcement in the EEZ may include shipping, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings. Appropriate sanctions may not include imprisonment and other corporal punishment. Even bonds or guarantees for the prompt release of arrested vessels and crews may be reasonable.

It is worth mentioning that UNCLOS classifies the seas into zones, each with their respective recognized rights. The general rule of thumb with UNCLOS zones and rights is that the further offshore, the lower the sovereign rights over the sea. Based on that rule, the "sink the ship" policy was admissible for the alleged activity in the territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic waters of Indonesia. Regarding illegal fishing in EEZs or other sovereign rights areas, Indonesia has an obligation to follow the UNCLOS mechanisms [20].

Indonesian authorities detonate and sink foreign fishing vessels that were caught practicing IUU fishing in Indonesian waters. Image retrieved from Mongabay [21].

However, the fisheries management policies applied by the former minister were not accepted by all the actors, nor by the coordinator of the ministry.

The change of direction in Indonesia's fisheries policy line (2019-present)

In October 2019, the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, was succeeded by Edhy Prabowo. The new minister promised to review the ban on trawling gear, and the sinking of foreign fishing boats. He argued that the “sink them all” policy was the result of ineffective communication over the past five years between the ministry and other stakeholders in the fisheries sector.

He added that this policy had not contributed to increasing Indonesia's fish exports, but rather that in 2018 a set of data showed that Indonesia's fish export had fallen to its lowest level in five years, according to with the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The data suggested that there was an unproductive relationship between Minister Susi and the fishing sector [22].

The new minister said he wanted to focus more on increasing Indonesia's fish exports, which he said requires a more fishery-friendly approach. When he took office, he convened industry stakeholders to hear his concerns. Many of them reportedly said they did not benefit from the previous minister.

Susi Pudjiastuti, and Edhy Prabowo. Image courtesy of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries; retrieved from Mongabay.

In general, Edhy proposes to roll back the most important regulations applied by Pudjiastuti. Regarding the sink-all policy, Edhy said that instead of sinking the ships, it would be better to give them away to local fishermen, academic research, or as floating hospitals. "But that doesn't mean we will never sink these ships again," Edhy added. However, his plans have met with backlash from maritime observers, who say the measures would only benefit large-scale fisheries rather than small-scale fishermen, who make up much of Indonesia's fisheries.

The fisheries management policies adopted by Prabowo so far can be essentially divided into two categories: 1) against IUU fishing in the Indonesian EEZ, and 2) the stimulation of domestic fish production.

Regarding the fight against IUU fishing, patrols have been intensified in the waters around the Natuna Islands; in January 2020, the Joint Regional Defense Command, a unit within the Indonesian Army (TNI) established in September 2019, was tasked with expelling Chinese vessels from this area. The operation involved warships and several maritime surveillance aircraft, the largest deployment around Natuna to date [23].

At the operational level, the Indonesian government has also strengthened Bakamla's deterrent capacity through the acquisition of twenty 12.7mm SM-5 machine guns; They also acquired a 30mm Remote Control Weapon System (RWS), which will help strengthen the self-defense capabilities of their four patrol vessels. Previously, Bakamla's ships were not allowed to use heavy military equipment, improving Bakamla's self-defense capabilities is an important step, as before they were relatively defenseless, compared to the coast guards of neighboring countries, including Malaysia and Vietnam. [24].

On the other hand, the second category of fisheries management policies adopted by Prabowo, that is, the stimulation of national fisheries production, has been promoted through a law to deregulate the extractive activity of sea resources. The so-called Job Creation (or omnibus) law was passed by Indonesian legislators on October 5 this year. The novelties that this law introduces are [25]:

• A vague definition of “small fisherman”, which considers as such vessels with a capacity equal to or less than 10 gross tons. This will allow large operators to qualify for subsidies, operate without a specific fishery permit, free enrollment in the national health care program, and access to low-priced fishing gear.
• Reopening access for foreign fishing vessels to Indonesian waters: In November 2014, Indonesia enacted a ban on these vessels in its waters, accusing them of engaging in IUU fishing, and nearly depleting the country's fish stocks to unsustainable levels. The new omnibus law will allow foreign fishermen to return, with less stringent operational requirements than before; foreign fishing vessel operators will only have to apply for a one-time permit from the central government and will no longer have to maintain a 70% Indonesian crew.
• The new law also abolished the National Commission for the Study of Fisheries Resources (Komnasjiskan), which was tasked with ensuring sustainable catch levels, based on scientific assessments.
• Open coastal and marine areas for mineral and coal extraction, geothermal exploitation, artificial island development through land reclamation and waste dumping.
• Reduces public participation in the preparation of environmental impact assessments, known locally as Amdal, thus limiting the groups that can have a voice, and those "directly affected" by proposed coastal development projects.

Fishermen, environmental activists and legal experts have called for the new law to be annulled. These changes threaten the livelihoods of small and traditional fishers, with foreign fishing fleets standing to gain the most. Experts say the new law also threatens the degradation of Indonesia's coastal and marine ecosystems for the sake of infrastructure development and tourism.

Protest against the omnibus law in the streets of Jakarta, after it was passed on October 5. Image recovered from people's dispatch [26].

Inshore-artisanal fishermen make up the majority of the Indonesian fishing fleet, operating a total of 650,000 boats throughout the archipelago. Simultaneously, this type of fishermen represent an important part of the population that lives in poverty in that country. Under the new law, small fishermen are no longer defined by the size of their boat. Experts say this is problematic because fishermen with bigger boats and more capital can now claim to be small fishers to reap the associated benefits [27]. The increase in fishing facilities could lead to an increase in the fishing effort in the region, and consequently, the overfishing of stocks that are already threatened.

The omnibus law, together with new fisheries management measures, represent, to a certain extent, a regression with respect to the advances that the policies applied by the former minister Susi Pudjiastuti obtained. Despite being criticized for the environmental damage that sinking and burning confiscated vessels could have at sea, the world has recognized Susi's achievements in the fight against IUU fishing. A 2018 study by the University of Indonesia's Center for Sustainable Ocean Policy, conducted in conjunction with Coventry University in the United Kingdom, found that its policy of sinking illegal fishing boats, coupled with a ban on illegal fishing vessels, large capacity foreigners; they had contributed significantly to increasing the Indonesian fish population [28].

Many traditional fishermen said that they no longer had to sail far into the ocean to find fish during the five years of Susi's ministry. The fact that fish exports did not automatically increase despite increasing fish stocks only demonstrated that Indonesian fishermen lacked the experience and facilities to catch and trade them on international markets [29].

Another worrisome reform is the possible weakening of the ban on trawling and purse seines, which are considered unsustainable fishing gear. The use of these gears, added to the storage capacities that some large vessels have, implies a huge inequality between the artisanal-riparian fishermen, and the owners (usually foreigners) of large fishing vessels.

Environmentalists have also warned that plans to auction off seized foreign fishing boats or give them to local fishermen could backfire by giving poachers a chance to buy them back, and by increasing fishing effort[30].

By way of conclusion: between fishing nets and the sovereign rights of a disputed region

It is interesting to observe the way in which the national fisheries policy of a country is often closely related to the exercise of sovereignty over the waters surrounding it. Thus, national fisheries management has various aspects that reach an international dimension. The national and international dimensions are two sides of the same coin. That is why the analysis of the Indonesian fishing policy can be done by dividing reality into two main areas: 1) the internal fishing policy, and 2) the foreign policy, aimed at defending the marine sovereignty of the Indonesian State.

1) internal fisheries policy

It is necessary to recognize the importance of fishing as an economic and cultural activity. It also plays a very important role in the country's food security. Throughout this analysis of the situation, this importance has been demonstrated. While it is true that fishing does not contribute a large percentage to the national GDP, it is vital for the food security of the Indonesian population. Due to the above, it is necessary to guarantee that the fishing resources are extracted in a sustainable way.

The sustainability of fishing is a national and international objective at the same time. Various international instruments protect marine wildlife, and the signatory countries have contracted the obligation to conserve them and their habitats. Thanks to various international agreements, contemporary fisheries policies tend to have an ecosystem approach, which prioritizes the well-being of the seas over the supply and demand of fisheries resources.

And it is that when these types of policies are applied in a country, they inevitably affect the rest of the world's ecosystems. Fishery resources move freely from one sovereign sea to another; the populations of some species have life cycles in which long migrations are necessary for the development, feeding and reproduction of the individuals. This is the first and most important international dimension of fisheries management, in ecological terms.

On the other hand, and returning to the human level of the struggle for political power, let us analyze the national fisheries management:

Indonesia's former Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries had taken drastic measures that effectively kept foreign vessels engaged in IUU fishing in Indonesia's EEZ at bay. In terms of law enforcement, and sustainability of the fisheries, Susi's policies were arguably successful.

However, her management was harshly criticized by the most powerful shipowners in the country, and also by some foreigners. Due to the discontent of the fishing elites, the minister was dismissed, and the policy for the use of sea resources was changed.

This change in national fishing policy also represented a change in foreign policy, aimed at attracting foreign capital through investments in the fishing, mining, tourism, and construction sectors.

The reforms to fisheries management introduced by the current Minister for Marine Affairs, Edhy Prabowo, bring with them more lax regulation. The ban on unsustainable fishing gear may be repealed; the requirements to obtain fishing licenses will be less strict, and in addition, there are no longer permits for specific fisheries, which puts at risk species whose stocks are already vulnerable and scarce. Failure to regulate the fishing of species already protected by international agreements gives rise to many illegal practices (such as finning, or the non-release of juveniles and gravid females), and undeclared landings.

Another worrying aspect of the new fisheries management is its centralized nature. Since the approval of the omnibus law, fishing permits and licenses are issued by the central government. This change brings benefits to fishermen, as it simplifies the bureaucratic processes necessary to fish. But at the same time it implies that the planning of certain fisheries will be done at the national level. This represents a planning and governance problem in an island country made up of hundreds of islands; The main complications that can arise from this fishing management are:

• Little regulation in specific fisheries, and in highly localized regions of the country: Due to the diversity of species and microclimates, fisheries management must be planned at a glocal level, taking into account the needs and possibilities of coastal communities. Not all fisheries are the same, and in fact different populations of fishery resources are taken, even if they are the same species.
• Centralized management implies top-down governance, in which the needs and views of fishing communities are quite possibly not taken into account, but in which, in contrast, the interests of large vessel owners are overrepresented. This inequality of participation in the creation of fishing policies can result in some fishermen not adhering to what is established, since they disagree with the management of resources.
• Centralized management could have the consequence that the budget allocated to scientific research ends up in the hands of only a few universities or marine research institutes. Per se it is not bad to invest in universities and institutes. However, investigating the various fish stocks of a country as large as Indonesia requires thousands of observers doing regular field work. Citizen science should expand around the world, and therefore the budget should not be monopolized by elitist scientific institutions. It is necessary to teach fishermen to dive, and to evaluate fish populations with rapid counting techniques.

The new lax regulation, coupled with the fact that foreign vessels will now be allowed to fish in national waters, will bring with it an increase in fishing effort, and therefore a decline in fish populations at the regional level.

2) the foreign policy aimed at defending the marine sovereignty of the Indonesian State

On the other hand, Prabowo has desisted from burning and sinking vessels that practice IUU fishing in Indonesian waters. During the administration of the previous minister, these floating bonfires were warning messages to anyone who wanted to venture into their waters, which worked to a certain extent. Now Prabowo has increased its patrolling of sovereign waters, arguing that its purpose is to fight IUU fishing, but in reality its purpose is mostly to defend the sovereignty of the Indonesian state north of the Natuna Islands.

With respect to the new and lax fishing regulations, it is evident that the current administration seeks to obtain a significant flow of foreign investment, at the cost of the environmental damage that this implies, and also at the cost of harming the artisanal fishermen, who consume a significant percentage of their catches.

Prabowo himself has stated that his goal is to increase seafood exports. There are Latin American examples of what happens when this type of export-focused production is applied. In Mexico, Peru and Chile, the process of internationalization of the fishing sector caused the increase in seafood prices in national markets. It has also caused the decapitalization of small producers, and the increase in fishing effort in general, with few economic returns [31].

The Prabowo administration's political discourse collapses when its ideals of economic development, support for small fishermen, and sustainable fishing are contrasted with licenses granted to foreign investors. Apparently, it is legal for wealthy foreign investors to commit environmental crimes and crimes against humanity... The Indonesian government grants privileges to those who are willing to pay for new licenses granted by the central government; privileges to fish unsustainably; precisely what the central government claims to combat in its EEZ!

Fishing in the EEZ is a sovereign right

In the current context of the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, Indonesia has had to be cautious with its pronouncements. While it is true that the claim of their sovereign rights over the EEZ are legitimate, and are stipulated in the UNCLOS; Facing China in this vein is impossible for the administration of Indonesian President Joko Widodo, since the country is at a clear disadvantage before the Chinese military forces.

An example of this is, for example, when President Widodo called to prevent the bilateral relationship from suffering havoc due to the incident that occurred in January 2020, when Bakamla discovered IUU fishing operations carried out by Chinese vessels in what Indonesia considers its EEZ.

The Indonesian government has chosen (for 30 years) to maintain a non-claiming state position in this maritime sovereignty conflict. That is why Indonesia has tried to keep Chinese vessels out of its EEZ, alleging conflicts of IUU fishing, and seeking international forums related to fishing to mediate the situation with the Asian giant (for example, the International Trade Organization, where anti-dumping measures are currently being discussed in the area of marine fishing).

For its part, it appears that China has opted for a significant escalation in its "grey area strategy", which consists of asserting its rights unilaterally, in this case by deploying Coast Guard vessels in the area. This scenario is highly likely, as during the GCC raid in September, the Chinese ship responded to the Indonesian authorities that it "had the right to patrol" within the "nine-point line." China exercises its self-proclaimed right to occupy de facto disputed waters in this region, and exercise its sovereign rights, including fishing.

China has a long history of reluctance to abide by UNCLOS, although under the Xi Jinping administration this foreign policy line has changed on some marine governance issues, such as trying to get its distant-water fleets achieve sustainable fishing levels. However, that purpose is far from being realized, and China's good faith is questionable when it comes to sustainable fishing.

Based on China's unilateral acts in similar situations in other regions of the world, it can be said that it is very likely that it will simply impose de facto control over the East Sea, but not before causing various conflicts with the countries bordering the region, with the US, and with other regional powers that have national interests in that region.