On the international scene, diplomacy is the means by which sovereign States, through peaceful negotiation, defend their interests and achieve their foreign policy objectives. Within the framework of the war between Russia and Ukraine, diplomacy has demonstrated its scope and limits, but in this context of international emergency, it has remained the main mechanism for the rapprochement and reconciliation of interests between States.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has not only created a panorama of uncertainty, but has also represented an area of opportunity for certain States that have undertaken diplomatic actions to satisfy their national interests and reduce the effects of the war within their countries. One of the exemplary cases is the diplomacy of the Republic of Turkey, an actor that has taken advantage of its position "as the easternmost European country and westernmost Asian country" to ensure benefits on different fronts, guided by its doctrine of "strategic depth".

The current framework of Turkey's foreign policy is framed by the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP for its acronym in Turkish) in 2002, led it to institutionalize the ideas of the doctor in International Relations and Political Sciences, Ahmet Davutoglu. Foreign Minister (2009-2014) and 28th Prime Minister of Turkey (2014-2016), in his book Strategic Depth: Turkey's Position and Role on the International Stage (2001), Davutoglu asserted that the country should expand its role on the international stage and not just limit itself to being the bridge between the Islamic East and the West, a principle that had limited Turkey's focus on maintaining stable relations with the European Union and the United States.

The proximity it has with other regions, as well as its historical experience and cultural relationship with territories that belonged to or had ties to the Ottoman Empire, such as the Lesser Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, Western Asia and Western Europe, make Turkey , according to Davutoglu, a central player in global geopolitics. For this reason, its mission consists of actively getting involved in mediation and conflict resolution, to obtain economic and political benefits, as well as to avoid confrontations with other States under the motto "zero problems with the neighbors" [1].

In turn, Turkey's foreign policy was strongly influenced by the term "swing states" of the American academy, which identifies these as countries with "growing economies, democratic governments and a strategic geographical position in different regions." " [2]; and "that they have neither accepted nor rejected certain aspects of the current global order" established after the end of World War II [3]. From this, Turkey is within these parameters, since it represents a political benchmark in neighboring regions, in addition to being a State that has actively consolidated a determining role in various organizations and forums at a global level, especially due to its initiatives mediation and conflict resolution.

Based on the above, in the development of Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine, Turkey has exercised its doctrine of "strategic depth" to mediate the negotiations between Sergey Lavrov of Russia and Dimitro Kuleba of Ukraine; it positioned itself as a determining actor in the accession process of Finland and Sweden in the Atlantic Alliance; and participated in high-level meetings with strategic leaders such as Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Ebrahim Raisi, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to resolve the issue of the food crisis and expand his regional security strategy.

Türkiye on the Atlantic Alliance front

In 1952, the twelve founding countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approved Turkey's accession to the alliance. Its incorporation represented a momentous event for Western geostrategy on the southern flank during the Cold War. Furthermore, its air, land, and sea capabilities made Turkey the second largest force in the organization. Currently, Turkey remains among the top five contributors to NATO operations, extending its involvement in Afghanistan, the Black Sea, Western Asia and the Mediterranean [4]; and is one of the eight main contributors to the budget of the Atlantic Alliance [5].

As a consequence of the insecurity caused by the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Sweden and Finland requested their adherence to the Washington Treaty in May 2022, in order to ensure a collective defense scheme with the capacity to deter and contain possible Russian aggressions. For its part, NATO would benefit from the strategic adhesion of Finland, which shares a 1,340-kilometer border with the Russian Federation, and in order to hinder Russian logistics in the Baltic Sea, the White Sea, and the Sea of Barents [6].

However, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, objected to the inclusion of both countries in the Organization, and demanded that they stop sheltering Kurdish militants from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK for its acronym in Turkish), which is considered a terrorist by the European Union, the United States and Turkey [7], and which is one of the main threats to the national security of the Eurasian country. This decision compromised NATO's interest in expanding its borders towards Russia, which is why Sweden and Finland found it necessary to negotiate with Turkey to reach an agreement in which both parties would benefit.

At the 2022 NATO Summit, held in Madrid, Sweden and Finland gave in to the demands of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and established an agreement in which Sweden would commit to managing the Turkish extradition requests of the alleged members of the PKK and that both countries would lift restrictions on arms sales to Turkey, which were established by its armed incursion into Syria in 2019 [8]. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was in favor of this agreement; in his words: “addresses Turkey's concerns, including those related to arms exports and the fight against terrorism” [9]. It is important to note that Stoltenberg prioritizes Turkey's objectives in his statement, which demonstrates his strategic stance for NATO in this context.

On the Atlantic Alliance front, Turkey demonstrated its “swing state” position. Erdogan, who established a position contrary to that of the Atlantic Alliance, used the requirement of unanimity among NATO members as a bargaining lever to expose to the international community that the North Atlantic countries were covering up members of the PKK, in addition to putting pressure on Helsinki. and Stockholm to extradite them in exchange for their entry into the Organization. This positioned Turkey as a central actor on the Madrid Summit agenda and demonstrated its pragmatic and versatile management of its NATO membership. It should be added that at the end of the negotiations, the Turkish strategy was not based on a zero-sum scheme, but on reconciling the interests of the parties involved (Sweden, Finland and NATO), based on their national interests.

Diplomacy with Russia and Iran

The versatility of Turkey's "strategic depth" has prioritized an active foreign policy on the Eastern front, mainly in Western Asia and the Lesser Caucasus, both of which are closely related to the country's historical legacy and of paramount importance to Neo-Thommanism. from Davutoglu.

Relations with West Asian countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Iraq have evolved positively since the rise of the AKP, with a view to addressing the Kurdish issue, Islamic terrorism, and regional migration [10]. . On the other hand, relations with States of the Lesser Caucasus such as the Russian Federation, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, have gained relevance in recent years, especially due to energy issues, the presence in the Caspian Sea and its active presence in regional conflicts such as the Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan [11]. Within the framework of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, two actors stand out from those mentioned above: Russia and Iran.

Relations between Turkey and Russia, since the rise of the AKP, have been based on closer economic relations and energy partnership. In particular, Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey in 2004 represented a watershed for both countries, which established agreements on economic, military and energy cooperation [12]. However, their relations have been defined by various disagreements over Turkey's attempt to become an alternative energy source for the European Union (EU), and the struggle for political leadership over the Lesser Caucasus [13]. Despite competition between the two countries, Turkey's NATO membership and the sale of Turkish drones to Ukrainian forces in the course of the war, Turkey's refusal to impose sanctions on Russia has led to relations between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin are becoming closer, in addition to turning the president of Turkey into their main mediator.

On the other hand, based on its renewed commitment to the Muslim world, Turkey has strengthened its relations with Iran. Both States have collaborated in energy matters, through the purchase and transport of Iranian natural gas through Turkey and the development of Iranian hydrocarbon deposits by Turkish companies. Turkey has also mediated disputes over Iran's nuclear program, reaffirming its position in favor of the denuclearization of the region and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the United Nations Security Council [14]. In terms of security, after the social uprisings of the Arab Spring, Iran, Turkey and Russia raised the Astana Process in 2017, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria, fight against Islamic terrorism, promote the process of the Constitutional Committee in Syria, in addition to asking the UN for greater humanitarian support to mitigate the effects of the civil war [15].

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, it is important to highlight two trilateral meetings involving these three countries: The “Türkiye-FR-Ukraine” meeting and the high-level meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin and Ebrahim Raisi. Firstly, the trilateral meeting between Turkey, the Russian Federation and Ukraine was held just before the opening of the 2022 Antalya Diplomacy Forum [16]. This meeting was attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Ukraine, Sergey Lavrov and Dimitro Kuleba respectively, who with the mediation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevulut Cavusoglu, agreed to a 12-hour ceasefire to establish humanitarian corridors and evacuate civilians. This was confirmed by the President of Ukraine, Volodimir Zelenski, who assured that thanks to this ceasefire it was possible to evacuate 35,000 people [17]. This represents a diplomatic achievement for Turkey, which has given prestige to its humanitarian foreign policy and for bringing the warring parties closer together at a negotiating table.

In contrast, the meeting held in Tehran was defined by a mix of objectives on the Turkish agenda: a) reduce the rise in food prices due to the blockade of Ukrainian grains, which has severely hit the African and Western Asian regions; and b) give continuity to the Astana Process to maintain its presence in Syria. Firstly, Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Vladimir Putin to, in addition to reiterating the negotiation of a peaceful agreement between Russia and Ukraine, request the unblocking of Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea.

This request resulted in the release of these exports, as well as Russian fertilizers through the Black Sea on July 22, three days after the meeting in Tehran. The agreement, with an initial duration of 120 days to open the Ukrainian ports of Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny, was signed by Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General; the Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu; and the infrastructure minister of Ukraine, Oleksander Kubrakov [18]. However, this request by Turkey is not disinterested, but allows the country to play a strategic role in controlling cargo traffic that crosses the Bosphorus Strait from the Black Sea.

Regarding the Astana Process, the meeting between the leaders served as a counterweight to prevent Turkey from carrying out a military operation in northern Syria. Vladimir Putin and Ebrahim Raisi asked Recep Tayyip Erdogan to avoid military operations. Likewise, the Supreme Leader of Iran, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated that "any type of military attack in northern Syria will definitely harm Turkey, Syria and the entire region, and will benefit the terrorists" [19]. In response to Turkey's interests, the leaders issued a joint statement in which they "rejected all attempts to create new realities on the ground under the pretext of combating terrorism, including illegitimate self-government initiatives" [20].

This, although it did not authorize Turkey to carry out its military operations, reaffirmed the commitment of Russia and Iran to maintain the territorial status quo of Syria and to hinder the Kurdish insurrection. In turn, the leaders agreed to continue with the Astana Process, as a means to maintain their influence in Syria, ensure their interests and demand greater support from the international community in the Syrian conflict.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the proactivity of Turkey's diplomacy has made it a benchmark for mediation and an actor that takes advantage of these mechanisms to maximize economic and political benefits. In the evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Turkey has demonstrated the versatility and pragmatism of its doctrine of "strategic depth" on the fronts of the conflict and has achieved substantial objectives for its national security and to maintain its position as a central player in the system. international.

On the western front, it took advantage of its NATO membership, Sweden's and Finland's quest to contain possible Russian threats, and NATO's interest in expanding its influence towards Russia's borders, in order to secure strategic national security objectives such as the commitment to extradite members of the PKK and the lifting of the restrictions imposed by Helsinki and Stockholm on the sale of arms.

In the East, Turkey acted as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, in favor of safeguarding international humanitarian law; it achieved the release of Ukrainian grain shipments, ensuring its strategic presence in the Black Sea, and it reached agreements with Russia and Iran to perpetuate its presence in Syria and hinder the self-determination of the Kurdish groups that threaten its territorial security. Turkey's diplomacy has shown that, in its participation as a mediator and conflict resolution bridge, it has managed to reconcile the parties involved, negotiate agreements and ensure their interests in the development of the conflict.