Analysis
Michel Cano
Violence and weapons: the legacy of the Central American civil wars
- Weapons disseminated during the Central American civil wars still remain in the region.
Central America was also a battle ground during the Cold War. Estimates of deaths from the civil wars in the region are around 300,000, and between 1.8 and 2.8 million refugees.[1] The armed conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua acquired international dimensions. In the midst of the global bipolar confrontation, the United States intervened directly with financial and logistical support for the ruling class in Guatemala and El Salvador made up of powerful agro-export oligarchs supported by the army; and the Contras in Nicaragua, a paramilitary group made up primarily of former members of Anastasio Somoza Debayle's National Guard whom the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew in 1979.
Cuba, for its part, provided support to the guerrilla combatants in Guatemala and El Salvador: The National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (URNG) and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). From the island, the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro provided logistical support —with doctors, medicines, communication devices, vehicles, military tactics, training, and weapons— to fight in the civil wars against the armies.
The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. Source: Radio Santa Fe.
Vanni Pettinà considers that "the internal social and political tensions in the Central American countries were strengthened by the systematic external interference that the Cold War led to in the region".[2] In Guatemala, for example, the income of agro-exporters was between 20 and 100 times higher than that of agricultural workers, in Nicaragua between 10 and 50 times, and in El Salvador between 3 and 100 times. The unequal distribution of land catalyzes these fractures. In Guatemala, 2.1% of agricultural producers controlled 72% of arable land, in Nicaragua 22% had 85% and in El Salvador 2% had power over 57.5% of the land. The oligarchic groups held great power due to the export of coffee, bananas, cotton, beef and sugar, highly demanded products in the world market and in the United States.[3]
For Fabrice Lehoucq, the military dictatorships in El Salvador and Guatemala functioned to promote the interests of the large coffee and banana producers. The origin of these alliances dates back to the 21st century when liberal dictators allied with coffee exporters to finance their efforts to defeat conservative caudillos. This association solidified the military regimes in the region. Only by promoting exports could dictators raise the taxes needed to build the forces to defend against overthrow.[4]
In the most radical interpretation of the Cold War, during Henry Kissinger's tenure as Secretary of State, the United States supported ferocious dictatorial regimes in South and Central America that systematically violated human rights. From the state apparatuses, there was an intense persecution against leftist groups, students, journalists, artists, teachers, religious and any group that the State considered a threat to national security for sympathizing with the Soviet Union, Cuba or the ideology of Marxism- Leninism. Thousands of people were killed or disappeared.[5]
Agusto Pinochet and Henry Kissinger. Source: Infobae.
Pettinà considers that President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy of détente in the framework of the Cold War and in the American hemisphere was essential for, first of all, the guerrilla organization and, in the case of Nicaragua, the success of the Sandinista revolution. Carter wanted to distance himself from the foreign policy toward Latin America formulated by former presidents Nixon, Ford, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The point of this strategy was respect for human rights.[6]
Under Carter's strategy, funding to South American dictatorships was reduced on the condition that they respect human rights. He also, through his diplomats and ambassadors, exerted pressure to lower the indiscriminate repression and opened human rights offices in diplomatic headquarters. This policy of non-interference and rights limited its actions in Central America when, at the end of the 70s, the guerrillas grouped together and intensified the armed struggle.[7]
Carter's policy did not like the American conservative sectors who asked for greater firmness in his actions. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the Tehran hostage crisis, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan were viewed by US public opinion as major failures in foreign policy. In this context, Ronald Reagan, a former Hollywood actor, launched his campaign for the presidency supported by conservative sectors, criticizing Carter's foreign policy.
As president, Ronald Reagan abandoned détente as the lynchpin of foreign policy and returned to a radical interpretation of the Cold War in his confrontation with the Soviet Union. Under this new doctrine, Reagan substantially increased his support for the ferocious military regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala. For example, in El Salvador, during 1980, the year in which Carter continued to govern, military aid was 5.9 million dollars. For 1984, already during the Reagan administration, the aid consisted of 196.6 million dollars.[8]
In the case of Nicaragua, with the support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Ronald Reagan government promoted the creation and financing of a paramilitary group that tried to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The Contras established their base of operations in Honduras. The Palmerola military base, in Comayagua, located less than 100 kilometers from the capital Tegucigalpa, was used to receive cargo planes with weapons.[9] However, Reagan encountered strong opposition in the United States Congress to finance the paramilitary group. This did not impede their objectives and through an illegal operation, the United States sold weapons to Iran — an action prohibited by Congress — to obtain financing for the Contras.[10]
The Nicaraguan Contra. Source: Wikipedia.
Contemporary violence in Central America
Regina Anne-Bateson argues that the civil war produced an order related to the ability of civilians to provide for their own security after the war, specifically in those localities where mass murder or major fighting occurred.[11] However, three decades after the civil wars ended, violent dynamics still prevail. Specifically in the Northern Triangle of Central America, contemporary violence is more due to a relationship with illegal market actors (organized crime) than to a political-military struggle between insurgents and the State.
In data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNOCD for its acronym in English), during 2018 the Central American region had the highest homicide rate in the world with 28.1 per hundred thousand inhabitants (pccmh ). In this figure, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala stand out with 52, 38.9 and 22.5 pccmh, respectively. Nicaragua, which experienced a violent process of civil war, Costa Rica and Panama are a clear exception to these contemporary dynamics of extreme violence since, during the same year, their homicide rates were 7.2, 11.3 and 9.4 pccmh respectively.[12 ]
Homicide in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. Source: Foundation 10.
Due to its geographical location, between the production of cocaine in South America and its high demand in the United States, Central America is of interest to the activities of criminal groups. The global cocaine market is very attractive to organized crime and other actors seeking high profits while assuming high risk. Due to its elasticity and the decrease in prices in the market, the control of routes and sales becomes essential to obtain high-level profits.[13] Various criminal groups dedicated to territorial control and drug trafficking operate in the region. Among these are powerful Mexican cartels such as “Los Zetas” and the “Sinaloa Cartel” who have alliances with local groups such as “Los Cachiros” in Honduras[14]; “Los Lorenzana”, “Los Mendoza”, “Los Chamale” in Guatemala; and “los Perrones” in El Salvador.[15]
Criminal groups in Central America compete for subnational territorial enclaves in search of economic gain. They do not seek to overthrow the state. When a criminal group manages to monopolize control of the enclaves, the levels of violence are low; however, when in competition with other organized crime groups or the state, they will be more likely to use violence to assert their hegemony, defend and expand their local control.[16] The department of Petén in Guatemala[17]; and the departments of Gracias a Dios, Copán and Colón in Honduras present high levels of violence related to territorial competition by criminal groups dedicated to drug trafficking.[18]
Plane intercepted, loaded with cocaine, in Gracias a Dios, Honduras. Source: Today News.
Central American gangs are violent actors in the region. These originate from Los Angeles, United States. In the early 1990s, the US government decided to carry out a massive deportation campaign, targeting those with criminal records. The deportees, affiliated with gangs in the United States, found in Central America an environment of marginalization, social exclusion, and lack of opportunities.[19] Urban gangs seek to control territories where they can establish illegal forms of extraction. They are involved locally in drug sales and extortion.[20]
Gangs also engage in murder, kidnapping, assault, and robbery. They seek to extract rents, execute justice, exercise violence and, on some occasions, provide security. Violence is a part of their culture and practice. Gangs use violence to defend their territories and expand. Controlling public spaces—bus routes, busy intersections, unlit streets are potentially lucrative.[21] The main gangs in Central America are “Calle 18” and the “Mara Salvatrucha”. Central American cities, such as Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, La Ceiba, San Salvador and Guatemala City, are havens for gangs.
El Salvador Anti-Gang Unit. Source: The Herald.
In the early 2000s, El Salvador and Honduras launched frontal combat campaigns against gangs known as "Mano Dura." These policies consist of an increase in the penalties for crimes, an increase in the presence of public forces, the use of the army, and serious violations of human rights. These policies backfired as the persecution caused gangs to become more professional, more cautious in their selection processes, and introduced violent initiation rites such as murdering a rival gang member.[22]
Weapons in Central America
In Central America, 77% of homicides are committed with a firearm. During the civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, large numbers of weapons were imported and disseminated. After the end of the civil wars and the demobilization of the combatants, an attempt was made to collect the weapons. In El Salvador, it is estimated that around 360,000 weapons were not delivered at the end of the war and many of these deposits were transferred to neighboring countries. In Guatemala only 1,824 firearms were delivered. In Nicaragua, only 17,000 weapons despite the fact that some 91,000 combatants were demobilized. Nicaragua destroyed 100,000 weapons, but many remain in the region.[23]
An estimated 2.2 million firearms were registered in Central America, of which 870,000 are registered by security forces and 1.4 million by civilians. It is also estimated that there are 2.8 million unregistered firearms. There are firearms to arm one in three men in the region.[24] According to UNOCD, there are two types of established flow: movement of arms within countries and movement of arms from Central America to other countries such as Colombia or Mexico. Stockpiles in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala have been identified as the largest sources of illegal firearms in the region. Nicaragua and Panama are also very important in this trade.[25]
Weapons seized in Costa Rica. Source: Interpol.
Despite the fact that Nicaragua has the most successful weapons destruction program in the region and its firearm homicide figures are below regional standards. Nicaragua is also the origin and destination of shipments of illicit arms.[26] In a report made by El Universal of Mexico, an arms trafficker tells that the origin of arms trafficking coming from Central America is Nicaragua. The weapons carry the route along the Mexico-Guatemala and Mexico-Belize borders. From there, passenger trucks carry hidden weapons to various warehouses located in the Tepito neighborhood of Mexico City.[27]
According to UNOCD, 36% of the arms trafficked to Colombia originate from Nicaragua and Panama. Also in Mexico, half of the military weaponry originates from Central America. Many of the hand grenades used by Mexican organized crime organizations come from Guatemalan military arsenals. The province of San Marcos, on Guatemala's Pacific coast, is an important point for arms trafficking from Panama to Mexico. Heavy weapons recovered in Mexico have been traced back to US sales to the Honduran military.[28]
Prices for illicit firearms vary, but tend to be excessively low, suggesting a saturated market. An AK-47 can be purchased for between $200 and $400. With 2.8 million illegal weapons, this suggests that the sum of the value of all illegal weapons would not exceed $500 million. In Central America, close to 16,000 firearms were seized in 2010, of which approximately 80% were pistols. The problem lies in the filtration. The escape of weapons from military and police use to illicit use due to the surplus. Several countries in the region manage various surpluses from the legacy of the decrease in armies during the peace process.[29]
The Salvadoran Army abandoning its weapons during the demobilization after the civil war. Source: elsalvador.com.
Conclusions
During the Central American civil wars, Cuba and the United States became actively involved in the conflict, financing the combatant groups. Thousands of weapons circulated to the countries in conflict. Those weapons still remain in the region and represent a serious threat to regional governance. Central America is the most violent region in the world and most homicides are committed with firearms. The surplus of weapons causes leaks and it is estimated that there are 2.8 million unregistered weapons circulating in the region. In Colombia and Mexico there is a high demand for illegal weapons by criminal groups that operate in those countries. From Central America, traffickers supply them with weapons. The discussion about violence in Central America must start from its catalysts: in this case, the availability of firearms.
Sources
[1] Lehoucq, Fabrice, The Politics of Modern Central America, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 30.
[2] Pettinà, Vanni, Historia Mínima de la Guerra Fría en América Latina, México, El Colegio de México, 2018, pp. 184.
[3] Ibid, pp. 183.
[4] Lehoucq, Fabrice, Op. Cit., pp. 19.
[5] McSherry, Patrice, Predatory States: Operation condor and covert war in Latin America, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005, pp. 107-138.
[6] Pettinà, Vanni, Op. Cit., pp. 185-188.
[7] Loc. Cit.
[8] Pettinà, Vanni, Op. Cit, pp. 221.
[9] Silva, Fernando, “Palmerola, el centro logístico del olvido”, Contra Corriente, https://contracorriente.red/2019/10/25/palmerola-el-centro-logistico-del-olvido/, consultado el 26 de agosto de 2020.
[10] BBC Mundo, “Reagan, Latinoamérica y la Guerra Fría”, 7 de junio de 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_3784000/3784325.stm, consultado el 26 de agosto de 2020.
[11] Anne-Bateson, Regina, Order and Violence in Postwar Guatemala, tesis, New York, Yale University, 2013, pp. 286.
[12] United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNOCD), “Victims of intentional homicide, 1990-2018”, https://dataunodc.un.org/content/data/homicide/homicide-rate, consultado el 26 de agosto de 2020.
[13] Ibid., pp. 76.
[14] Insight Crime, “Los Cachiros”, Insight Crime, 7 de abril de 2017, https://es.insightcrime.org/honduras-crimen-organizado/cachiros-perfil/, consultado el 26 de agosto de 2020.
[15] UNOCD, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, Vienna, UNOCD, 2012,pp. 23-25.
[16] Yashar, Deborah, Homicidal Ecologies: Illicit Economies and Complicit States in Latin America, Cambridge, University Press, 2018, pp. 73.
[17] Dudley, Steven, “Homicidios en Guatemala: Análisis de los datos”, Insight Crime, 10 de abril de 2017, https://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/homicidios-guatemala-analisis-datos/, consultado el 26 de agosto de 2020.
[18]Korthuis, Aaron, “The Central America Regional Security Initiative in Honduras”, Wilson Center, 2014, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-central-america-regional-security-initiative-honduras, consultado el 26 de agosto de 2020.
[19] Yashar, Deborah, Op. Cit. pp. 94.
[20] Ibid, pp. 74.
[21] Yashar, Deborah, Op. Cit., pp. 90-98.
[22] Wolf, Sonja, “Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas”, Latin American Politics and Society, 54(2012), pp. 65-99.
[23] UNOCD, Op. Cit., 2012, pp. 59-60.
[24] Ibid, pp. 83.
[25] UNOCD, Op. Cit., 2012, pp. 61-62.
[26] Ibid, pp. 61-62.
[27] El Universal, “Pais de armas: la ruta Centroamérica-Tepito”, El Universal, 17 de noviembre de 2019, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/de-centroamerica-tepito-la-ruta-del-trafico-de-armas, consultado el 29 de agosto de 2019.
[28] UNOCD, Op. Cit., 2012, pp. 62.
[29] Loc. Cit.